Colonel Hans Granlund is Sweden's Defence Attaché in Ukraine. In a column for FSN Perspektiv, he shares impressions and reflections from his first six months in the country.
Being a defence attaché in a country fighting for its survival against an opponent that spares no means is, to say the least, different. The job, which involves reporting on conditions in the host country, establishing contacts, and facilitating meetings between the capitals, takes on other expressions. In Kyiv, the reporting mostly involves providing a picture of how the war is developing and trying to capture how Sweden can best assist Ukraine in their—and our—struggle. It has been a long time since the stakes were higher than they are now. What characterises this struggle is that it is existential. Ukraine is fighting for its identity, its survival, and for a world order that we in Sweden also recognise and adhere to. A world order where each nation chooses how it wants to live, a world order where the great nations have not divided the world into spheres of interest where they dictate how smaller nations should behave. Russia has openly declared that Ukraine should be incorporated into the Russian sphere of power and take orders from Moscow. The perspective that Russia displays is a threat to us all, in the short or long term, in a way that many of us probably cannot even imagine. The war in Ukraine is also our war to relate to. In the long run, it is not enough to "not lose" that war. It is a war that must be won—for all our rights to determine our path into the future. This is obvious when one moves here in Kyiv, and often, but not always, when one reads about and talks to observers outside Ukraine.
There is sometimes a belief that one can negotiate with Russia and its dictator Putin on these issues, that one could reason and problematise about a negotiated peace. I sometimes wonder where these observers get these ideas from. A state that daily absorbs large losses, sometimes up to 1,000 soldiers, that without blinking fires hundreds of missiles and drones at civilian targets, that openly declares that parts of the country it has invaded are part of the motherland—is that a state that seems ready to negotiate? My assessment is that there is no one to negotiate with. That there is no "lowest common denominator" where one can meet and agree. So what is required to win the war? Will to fight, endurance, resilience, weapons, and the continued support of the international community, in all forms. In 2023, we saw Ukraine go on the counteroffensive with quickly trained and newly equipped units, without air superiority, many soldiers without experience, against an opponent that had prepared for over a year. In a situation that few, if any, modern equipped Western powers would have chosen to launch an offensive from, Ukraine chose to take on the task, for the alternative was worse. They have fought against uneven odds against an opponent that on paper is overwhelming and have not only held Russia at bay but have inflicted significant losses on them. But there is a long way to go to victory. That is why continued support, in all its forms, is crucial. Ukraine has, under extraordinarily difficult circumstances, transformed and expanded its military. Changes that were talked about when we restructured the Swedish defence over twenty years ago, they have implemented in surprisingly short time, and more.
Ukraine has shown how to fight unconventionally and asymmetrically, how to adapt production within the country, how to go from what was once called prototypes to full-scale production, how to introduce systems without long lead times and with reasonable risk-taking. In short, how to accelerate during an ongoing war. While the battle is ongoing, one must be able to train soldiers, specialists, and officers. The capability must exist to both produce more materiel, introduce entirely new systems, evaluate and adapt faster than the opponent—especially if the doctrine is to defend oneself, as this inevitably means that the attacking opponent chooses the time, place, and method for its initial offensive operations, and thus also automatically has the initial strategic initiative.
The conflict in Ukraine also clearly shows that war on an industrial scale against a technically near-equal opponent is won by those who have stockpiles for the initial and continued battle. The war reminds us that the turnover of ammunition, missiles, and drones is greater than previously assessed and that the losses are high. In the age of precision warfare, the old axiom that quantity is also quality remains true. The stockpiles must exist but must also be able to be replenished through reach-back to allies, or through one's own ability to accelerate the production of ammunition, consumables, and spare parts. Vehicles, aircraft, and ships must simultaneously be kept operational over time. The ability to recover, reorganise, and re-establish must be organised and resourced already in peacetime if one wants to win this type of all-encompassing conflict.
As a defence attaché in Ukraine, I see this unfold before my eyes daily. Fortunately, there is sometimes, though not always, also time to reflect on what I describe. Seeing the determined glow in the eyes of a young captain as he describes his daily life, talking to a brigade commander about how the battle in his area is conducted, observing ordinary people on the street, in Kyiv or further east in the previously occupied areas, gives confidence but also creates concern.
Ukraine is worth defending. For if Ukraine falls, who is next, where will Russian expansion appear next? Have we prepared ourselves as well as we can, will we be able to resist? These are questions that inevitably arise.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine must be said to be a failure. Something that many assess was intended to be a strategic assault, something that militarily would be over in days, is now entering its third year of war. But what does that mean? The Finnish President Niinistö put it well in his New Year's speech: "...one should remember that Russia is never as strong as it appears to be, but also never as weak as it seems." It is a Russian failure, but it is just a failure and not a defeat. Let us remind ourselves of this and not lose focus.
Ukraine's fate is entirely linked to continued support, in all its forms. Without that support, the situation could quickly deteriorate, not only for Ukraine but for all of us. A successful and revanchist Russia is a very dangerous neighbour. Just look at the progress in the occupied parts of Ukraine, or how they violate international law on the battlefield, how they systematically target civilian targets, and how they persistently work on Russification of occupied areas.
Sometimes I hear it suggested whether we should really support a country as corrupt as Ukraine. Do the supports end up where they are useful? To that, I say only: What is the alternative? That there has been systematic and widespread corruption in Ukraine is no secret. It is also clear that they now both acknowledge it and try to do something about it. All the way from the president and through the state administration, one can see a decreasing tolerance for both corruption and sheer incompetence.
A young generation is emerging, a generation now shaped by the war, who have seen friends and their nation endure so much due to a lingering post-Soviet mindset. After meeting many representatives of this new generation, I confidently place my hope that they will continue to develop their country towards becoming full members of both the EU and eventually NATO. But this too will not happen overnight, and without continuous support and our presence, the struggle for a modern European Ukraine will be prolonged. We should help to help themselves without being naive or underestimating the complexity of this work, not least within the military sector.
2024 will be a year filled with continued battles, hardships, successes, and setbacks. Unless Russia's own population, as in previous conflicts, rises and takes its own destiny into its hands, the war will continue. During the year, we will see the war, which already mixes the first and third world wars in everyday life, continue to develop. Is this the year we see drones systematically start to combat drones? Is this the year that one party makes another technological or tactical breakthrough? Is this the year we see the naval war in the Black Sea continue to be dominated by unmanned explosive boats, or will countermeasures catch up? Is this the year we see Ukraine finally establish its own air superiority? Is this the year Ukraine is given the opportunity to rotate worn frontline units through the announced general mobilisation? And is this the year it is given the opportunity for continued training and the build-up of a Ukrainian military that can, in the long term, make a decisive impact on the battlefield?
The future, none of us knows what it holds. But we can contribute to shaping it in the direction we want, in all the ways available to us. Happy New 2024!
Hans Granlund
Colonel and Sweden's Defence Attaché in Ukraine