Sweden's internal security is under serious threat, and the country stands on the brink of war. An explosion of false messages online has polarised the population and generated intense emotions. Disinformation has caused violent riots and a dramatic increase in false alarms, placing further strain on the police. At the same time, sabotage is being carried out against water treatment facilities, electricity installations, and other critical infrastructure using drone swarms. These attacks have caused serious disruption and damage, heightening public anxiety. The crisis is compounded by a large-scale cyber attack that paralyses payment systems, mobile communications, and transport networks, leading to chaos and widespread concern. Citizens are beginning to doubt society's ability to manage the crisis, and many are considering leaving the country.
This scenario is not merely a dystopia but reflects genuine risks. A hostile actor can use disinformation, drone attacks, false alarms, and cyber attacks to trigger a societal crisis. A foreign power could orchestrate such activities as a precursor to an armed attack.
For such actors, the cost of action would be low, while the potential effect would be enormous. These actions could furthermore be carried out with a high degree of deniability and without physically entering Swedish territory. Russia's strategy for the exercise of power illustrates this clearly, with its focus on non-military measures such as information warfare, economic pressure, diplomacy, and cyber attacks. These measures aim to create instability and confusion, which can pave the way for military means if needed to achieve strategic objectives. Hybrid activities of this nature underline the need for robust measures to protect critical infrastructure and to ensure that the Swedish Police Authority, among others, has the capacity to handle such threats.
Countering disinformation and riots requires strong community engagement and continuous situational analysis by the police. Sweden's multicultural society, with its many diaspora communities, demands a dual focus encompassing both domestic and foreign affairs. This was made clear through incidents such as Quran burnings and influence campaigns targeting the Swedish social services system (LVU). To ensure resources for effective and sustained operations, cooperation between public, private, and civil society actors may prove decisive. Society's resilience depends on how well these actors can collaborate to deliver targeted counter-narratives capable of serving a preventive function.
The drone threat is already a reality requiring immediate action. This became evident shortly before Russia's invasion of Ukraine, when large drones were observed circling above Swedish nuclear power plants. To address this type of aerial threat, it is necessary to develop technology capable of disrupting drone signals and to train personnel in handling drone incidents. Investment in new technology for the detection and neutralisation of drones is essential, as are strategies to protect critical infrastructure from potential drone attacks. Cooperation between authorities, research institutes, and private actors will be crucial in developing a robust, society-wide defensive capability against these drone threats.
The false alarms and cyber attacks bear a strong resemblance to what was observed during Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. That invasion began with cyber attacks and a wave of false alarms that placed the Ukrainian police under severe strain. Similar incidents could very well occur in Sweden. Given the hostile potential that artificial intelligence (AI) brings, it is essential to develop the capability to rapidly verify the authenticity of alerts. This requires investment in alarm verification technology and training for staff at police contact centres and command centres, to increase their awareness of hybrid threats including this particular method of operation. AI-based systems can be used to analyse alarm data in real time, identify patterns indicating false alarms, and prevent such alarms from draining police resources. By preparing for false alarms and developing methods to manage them, the police can reduce the potential future burden on resources. It is also important to foster a culture of continuous readiness and training, in which personnel are regularly exercised in identifying and responding to hybrid threats.
To address threats that may materialise before an armed attack, Sweden, including the Swedish Police Authority, must strengthen its preparedness. The police need to develop their capacity to coordinate operations with other authorities and private organisations. This requires robust cooperation structures and regular exercises to ensure an effective response. It is also essential that police personnel become aware of the threat landscape and their role in such a situation. Investing in these measures may cost both time and money, but it is a necessary investment in our security. Failure to prepare may lead to far greater costs in the future.
Patrik Thunholm Police officer, reserve officer, and author