Swedish Policy Games is a national competition open to students, in which participants are tasked with simulating real-world decision-making in foreign and security policy. On the day of the competition, ten student teams gather to jointly analyse a given scenario. Each team develops concrete policy recommendations, which are then presented before a jury of experts in the field.
– The competition attracted observers and representatives from, among others, the Swedish Armed Forces (Försvarsmakten), international defence attachés, and the Minister for Civil Defence, Carl-Oskar Bohlin. The hope is that participants leave the games with a strong desire to continue engaging with issues relating to the future security of Sweden and Europe, says Gustav Christensson, analyst at Consillio International and co-founder of Swedish Policy Games.
One of the jury members was Major General Karlis Neretnieks. Over a long career within the Swedish Armed Forces, he has served as brigade commander, operations director at the then-Central Military District, and as a total defence adviser on Central and Eastern Europe at the Ministry of Defence. He is a member of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences and has also served as rector of the Swedish Defence University (Försvarshögskolan). During a lunch break, Nordic Defence Sector (NDS) had the opportunity to interview Neretnieks.
Less than an hour before the interview, Sweden's Minister for Civil Defence, Carl-Oskar Bohlin, had delivered a speech in the Swedish Defence University's auditorium. The address and the subsequent discussion largely centred on Sweden's preparedness, and how the country should manage the transition currently under way in both civil and military readiness. According to Neretnieks, the focus on preparedness is welcome and urgent. Sweden's readiness in 2026 is far from sufficient.
– Preparedness is inadequate, that much is simply a fact. Work has admittedly begun on a broad front across municipalities and government agencies, but it takes time before results materialise. The restoration of civil defence shelters is one example, he says.
Neretnieks also turns his attention to Ukraine, where civilian and military infrastructure is being systematically targeted by Russia. The Swedish government's announcement earlier this year of a multi-billion-kronor investment in Swedish air defence is therefore, in his view, welcome.
– It is better to protect infrastructure than to repair it, and the government's investment is definitely necessary. But the question is: when will these investments be ready? I think we are on the right track, but there is a problem with the time dimension, he says.
Neretnieks continues:
– The time dimension is very much dependent on what happens in Ukraine. If the Russians are able to free up resources from Ukraine, that is to say in the event of a ceasefire or something similar, then the threat to the Baltic Sea region and the Baltic states grows dramatically, he says.
In a column in Officerstidningen (the Swedish Officers' Journal), Neretnieks discussed when Russia will have the capability to carry out a large-scale operation against the West. Some share Neretnieks' view that this capability could exist within just a few years of the war in Ukraine ending. Other analysts believe Russia may need considerably longer.
That is a rather unreliable timeline. Can we be certain that Russia shares our assessment of when they will be ready?
– The time dimension is a major uncertainty. There is a very important factor that we often forget to take into account. It is by no means certain that the Russians have the same view as we do of what constitutes a combat-ready unit. My guess is that our notion of a combat-ready unit, in Russian and Ukrainian eyes, amounts to some kind of extreme luxury product, gilded in every conceivable respect.
Neretnieks argues that Russia and Ukraine are today fighting under entirely different conditions, with different force ratios and standards of medical care and logistics than those considered normal in the West. Because of this, the West also risks deceiving itself when assessing Russia's ability to generate new units.
– We simply have different perceptions of reality when it comes to what a usable unit is and what it should look like, he says.
Instead, he argues that a decisive factor is whether Russia considers it possible to wage war without the United States and other actors becoming involved: the possibility of conducting a swift operation without triggering a world war, rather than the quality of units on paper.
– What we are now seeing with Trump and the actions of the United States is deeply alarming, and represents an absolutely critical security dimension. We can hold whatever opinions we like and write as many analyses as we wish on the subject, but what do the men in the Kremlin believe, and how do they interpret the United States? The more they consider the US to be disengaged from Europe, the greater the risk of military adventurism from the East, says Neretnieks.
During the latter half of the twentieth century, Sweden's preparedness was comparatively strong, and the character of war more predictable. Is it harder to prepare for what a conventional war will look like today?
– Yes, it is quite clear that the character of war has changed. Tomorrow's war is not the same as what we prepared for during the Cold War. There is an enduring historical truth, namely that war never turns out as one imagined, he says, and offers examples:
– The First World War, the Second World War, the Vietnam War, the Iraq War. We see the same pattern in all of these conflicts. It always turns out to be something other than what was anticipated beforehand, to a greater or lesser extent, says Neretnieks.
At the same time, he argues that certain components will remain, albeit in different forms. Bridges will still need to be repaired in the future, even if it is a cruise missile rather than a bomber that has destroyed them. Drone development has, however, added an entirely new dimension, encompassing not only airborne drones but also ground-based and naval variants.
– We do not yet have the answers to that. There are partial answers and there are theories. But it is only once we have acquired the equipment ourselves and exercised with it on a fairly large scale that we will gain a sense of how to conduct the next war, he says, and continues:
– Today, the deep knowledge required is not present within the units. It is the units that fight, not the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) or the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV). These are agencies that are skilled at devising smart methods and procuring equipment, but it is within the units that the methods must be applied and the equipment used.
He argues that the most important element of officer training is not the ability to construct theories, but to develop an officer's capacity for decision-making, so that they can handle the situations that arise in combat, or in other activities associated with combat, with determination and imagination.
– We need more doers than philosophers, he says.
If we look across the Baltic Sea towards Finland and the Baltic states, do they have more doers than philosophers, in your view?
– Both yes and no. Finland never fell into the same trap as we did. Namely, the notion that Sweden was best defended in Afghanistan and that international missions should be the Swedish Armed Forces' sole task.
– Finland maintained that the defence of the country is the primary task and everything else is secondary. As a result, they have retained a structure and a mindset linked to territorial defence, which we are now trying to recreate, he says.
Neretnieks also discusses the Baltic states and highlights the fact that all three countries began their journey long after their Nordic neighbours. Neither Estonia, Latvia, nor Lithuania had an armed force when the Berlin Wall fell, which means that much of the work had to be started from scratch.
– They are building and investing relentlessly, in a positive sense. There are no countries that allocate as large a share of their GDP to defence purposes as the Baltic states and Poland. At the same time, they have small populations and limited economies. So no matter how much they arm themselves, it will never be sufficient to defend against Russia on their own. It simply cannot be done, he says.
Instead, the primary question, according to Neretnieks, is how the Nordic countries, together with other allies, can contribute to the defence of the Baltic states. He argues that Sweden's greatest contribution to regional deterrence is precisely that: contributing to the defence of the Baltic states.
– If we are talking about serious deterrence, we should plan to participate with several brigades in the Baltic states. They do not need to be in place, but it must be made very clear to the Russians that if they cause trouble in the Baltic states, Sweden will respond. The same applies to the Danes, and also to the British and the French, he says.
Neretnieks draws a parallel that historians have discussed at length: would Stalin have attacked Finland in 1939 had he known it would also mean war with Sweden?
– We do not know, but the thought is rather interesting. Would Russia attack one of the Baltic states if they knew it would automatically mean combat against Swedish, Danish, and British forces as well?
Perhaps Stalin was counting on Europe being sufficiently weak and divided to not come to the rescue?
– That may well be the case, and it is precisely for that reason that deterrence in the Baltic states is so important for us, says Karlis Neretnieks in conclusion.