The submarine force has assumed a new role due to Sweden's entry into NATO. Not in the sense that the submarine's tactical tasks or operational capability have changed, but in the context of NATO and the Baltic Sea region, the addition of the Swedish submarine force's capability to NATO represents an important piece that was previously missing from its toolkit.
Let me explain:
Sweden has a tradition spanning over 120 years of designing, building, maintaining, modernising, and operating its own conventional submarines. After World War II, and subsequently during the Cold War—a period of neutrality, non-alignment, and with a pronounced threat—Swedish submarine capability was forced to be adequate, reliable, and not least; combat-ready.
Sweden has developed about 25 classes (series) of diving boats and submarines, a total of approximately 80 during this period. From a technical perspective, Sweden has been at the forefront and driven innovations such as air-independent propulsion systems, Stirling, which allows for long endurance without the submarine needing to expose masts above the surface.
In addition, the hallmark of Swedish submarines is their signature, shock resistance, and manoeuvrability. The submarines are extremely quiet, which has also been confirmed in international contexts. The boats can withstand a substantial impact, meaning they can continue the fight or return to base on their own in the event an adversary drops a depth charge nearby.
Finally, the manoeuvrability allows the crews to navigate the submarine in extremely shallow and very narrow waters, with good safety and without being detected. Deadly war machines.
To be able to handle these technologically advanced vessels requires personnel with very high technical competence, specific personal qualities, and experience in handling submarines in pressured situations. This in a completely unforgiving environment, which life underwater is, and under a threat from the enemy that is particularly high because the submarine threat is what an enemy wants to eliminate first.
A regional competence that is unique to the crews of the Swedish submarine force. It is developed in narrow, busy, shallow, and opaque waters, as the sea is in Sweden's vicinity, and as I began with—we have been forced to develop submarine capability. Alone.
The military geography changed with Sweden's and Finland's entry into NATO. The border to be defended does not in all situations lie at the Swedish territorial border but in the NATO context east of the Baltics.
The Baltic Sea region in this context is to be regarded as an area whose volume the good forces must own, both on, above, and below the surface. This is not done without a capability for underwater operations or the ability to operate from the volume below the surface.
With Sweden and Finland in NATO, we do not only need to defend the nation's border but also NATO's—we need to own the Baltic Sea. This ownership is needed to secure the sea routes from the west all the way to the eastern states of the Baltic Sea.
Furthermore, the control needs to enable troop transports and logistical supply to the Baltics, i.e., create operational depth and operational mobility. Sweden's submarine force is a prerequisite for ownership because it ties up enemy resources, enables control and connections, and denies the adversary the same.
Does this rest on the nation of Sweden? Yes, to a large extent. The submarine nations in the Baltic Sea are few—only Germany and Poland have capabilities beyond Sweden's.
And with that said, the Polish capability is in a period of low availability, rather under reacquisition. Germany has submarines and the competence to handle narrow and shallow waters like the Baltic Sea, but also operates westward, beyond Skagerrak and Kattegat.
So yes, the responsibility for submarine operations in the Baltic Sea rests heavily on the Swedish submarine force. It is the puzzle piece that now fits perfectly into the NATO puzzle.
The strength of the Swedish submarine force is obvious to me, as I am trained in the unit and trained in underwater combat. But it is now particularly clear to me, in the role I have as Swedish submarine chief, through the expectation expressed by NATO.
I had admittedly not expected otherwise. And the submarine force entered NATO with confidence, absolutely. Sweden took its responsibility in the alliance seriously from the day of entry when Sweden operated a submarine under the NATO flag, fully integrated and under NATO's command. Military strategic communication, god damn it!
Do we manage the task, do we have endurance, and are the resources sufficient?
HMS Halland is, as the last in its class, recently launched after a mid-life modification which means improved and developed capability. Thus, the submarine force consists of four modernised and qualified vessels with a sharp capability range that can operate in the challenging environment of the vicinity but also in temperate climates.