Gripen E vs F-35? The Wrong Question to Ask

There’s been a lot of debate about which fighter jet is “best,” the F-35 or the Gripen E, after Saab offered Canada the option to buy Gripens instead of more F-35s. Many want to turn it into an all-or-nothing issue, and the least serious commentators pit them against each other instead of discussing how dangerous they would be to the enemy, which is, of course, bonkers.

Comparing fighter aircraft fairly and unambiguously is difficult, bordering on impossible. Just defining the conditions under which the comparison should take place, BVR combat, deep strike, reconnaissance, DCA/OCA, patrolling, show of force, etc., would require a full dissertation. It’s a bit like arguing about which car is best without specifying the terrain or the intended use. But instead of getting into a contest of whose is “bigger,” I’ll try to highlight the complexity here: that there may not be a single clear winner, that other factors matter, and that there are advantages to having both.

Full disclaimer:

I’m a former Gripen pilot.

That probably makes me biased, but I’ll try to be as objective as possible, even if that’s not entirely achievable. And for the record, I haven’t been asked by Saab to write this, nor have I asked them to approve it.

Generations

What “generation” a fighter belongs to is a favorite metric for the shallowest comparisons. Gripen E is usually described as generation 4.5 and the F-35 as generation 5, and therefore - case closed - one is “better.” But the only fundamental difference here is that the F-35 has stealth: the ability to reduce radar detection. That’s a single attribute. Why not just call it what it is instead of lumping everything into a generational label?

If the generational concept is supposed to summarize the overall capability of an aircraft, shouldn’t the different attributes each have a “generation,” and the final assessment be some kind of average?

When it comes to the quality and capability of the Electronic Warfare (EW) systems, comparing them is extremely difficult. Much of their performance depends on the software. The hardware appears broadly similar, 360-degree coverage and GaN antennas, at least on newer F-35s. Gripen E’s EW hardware is newer, but that doesn’t automatically mean better. They’re definitely in the same generation here, and EW is a major part of how “good” a fighter is, even though it’s so classified that no vendor can actually be held accountable for their claims.

The software in a fighter aircraft, assuming the hardware is roughly comparable, is the most important component by far. Software is as critical as a brain is to a soccer player. One example: when Sweden’s FOI (similar to the U.S. DARPA) spent two years testing an AI-based decision support system called Rattlesnaq™ (by Avioniq) in a Gripen C - replacing its already strong system, similar to that of the F-35 - the result was an increase in operational effectiveness of several hundred percent! And that came only from replacing the part of the software that displays enemy capabilities. The point here (besides a shameless plug for an Avioniq product) is that something invisible to outsiders comparing fighters can change effectiveness by hundreds of percent, far more than a radar with twice the range or an engine with 50% more thrust.

So how do we compare generations between the F-35 and the Gripen E? The F-35 is called fifth-generation because of stealth. Gripen E is considered 4.5 because it lacks stealth in its airframe configuration, yet it can have decision-support systems associated with sixthgeneration concepts. Do we average the components (giving Gripen E something like 5.25), or does the most advanced component define the platform, making Gripen E sixthgeneration? There’s no real answer here, even though I know what each manufacturer wants you to think. Personally, I think the generational system is too simplistic to be useful at all, but you can’t avoid the discussion, and you shouldn’t let a single feature define the whole.

Stealth

Radar Cross Section (RCS) below a certain threshold is often referred to as stealth in layman’s terms. It’s more complicated than that. The core idea is preventing the enemy from detecting you, or at least not early enough to act. If you see your opponent well outside the No Escape Zone, that’s usually good enough, though more detection range is often better, up to a point.

How “stealthy” an aircraft is depends on its RCS, the enemy radar’s power, antenna size, processing ability, scan rates, target angle, and more. In short: stealth is conditional and not a binary feature.

There are many ways to detect an aircraft. The most common is a fighter radar (X-band), and stealth is a clear advantage there. It should absolutely not be understated that the F- 35 has a significant advantage in reducing enemy detection range, especially against older or less capable radars. The reduced RCS (0.005 vs 0.5 m2) means around a third of the detection range if you do the calculations and the stealth works optimally. It’s easy to think that detection range would scale linearly with RCS, but there’s actually a r4 relationship.

However, to fully benefit from stealth, you can’t use your own radar—doing so is like turning on a flashlight in a dark room. Even if they don’t see the flashlight itself, they know exactly where it is. This means a stealth aircraft in stealth configuration can’t see others unless someone else provides that information via datalink. And both sides can get that information from long-wave ground-based radars, which see stealth aircraft just fine.

The main point: it’s complicated. Stealth has advantages, but how big depends on what the opponent does. If both sides fly with silent radars and rely on long-wave ground stations (which Russia and China have heavily invested in since the 1990s), then the playing field is level. The F-35 gains its edge if the enemy’s fighter radar can’t get a lock at firing range. But angle and IRST also matter.

Infra-Red Search and Track (IRST) has advanced massively in the last decades. It’s a passive sensor detecting infrared radiation, i.e. heat. Aircraft are hot, especially against the cold background of high-altitude air. Today, IRST sensors can see out to 100+ km, and both Gripen E and F-35 have them. But what matters is whether the enemy has them, and they do. China and Russia have invested heavily in IRST, obviously in response to Western stealth reliance.

The enemy can fly with silent radars and use IRST to detect targets. Then it becomes a competition between IRST capabilities, and here it’s hard to say definitively who’s ahead. Effective use of IRST also requires solid sensor fusion, again, a software quality issue.

One downside of stealth is cost, in both lifecycle costs and design compromises. A large part of stealth capability comes from the radar-absorbent coating. Maintaining it is expensive and time-consuming. That reduces aircraft availability and increases fleet size requirements. Internal weapon bays also limit payload. The moment you hang external stores, stealth is largely gone.

A stealth aircraft carries that burden through its whole lifecycle. As mentioned, the advantages today are already smaller than in the 1990s, and they risk shrinking further. The F-35 is expected to serve for at least 50 more years, and it’s unlikely that stealth will remain decisive that long. The airframe is what it is, optimized for RCS rather than aerodynamics.

Russia and China, meanwhile, are investing heavily in detecting and targeting very small RCS profiles, smaller than the F-35's, which is considerably larger than the F-22's.

Speed and Fuel

One of the few attributes that can be compared with numbers is speed, but maximum speed alone is not useful. Instead, you need to look at range efficiency, travel to and from the combat area, and combat speed once you get there.

In terms of range, Gripen E generally wins, but largely because the F-35 can’t carry external drop tanks without losing stealth. If you drop the stealth requirement and use external tanks, the ranges become comparable.

Once in the combat zone, avoiding enemy missiles requires sustained high speed and short bursts of acceleration before missile launch. Here, Gripen E has a clear advantage. It’s 10–20% faster overall, both in max speed and on dry thrust. The latter usually matters more, since reaching max speed (Mach 2.0 for Gripen E vs. Mach 1.6 for F-35) is impractical in real combat. Flying Mach 1.2 instead of Mach 0.97 is akin to maintaining 20% higher running speed in soccer. This matters especially in DCA/OCA missions.

If the F-35 hadn’t been designed for stealth and for the STOVL variant, it would likely have been on par with Gripen E in speed and range.

Versions and Upgrades

Comparisons also depend on timing and configuration. Should we compare Gripen E, almost a completely new aircraft apart from its general shape, with F-35 Block 4, which won’t arrive for years (assuming no further delays)? One side says that Gripen E is from the 90s and the other that Block 4 will not arrive for 10 more years.

Different nations configure their aircraft differently. For the F-35, decisions are influenced proportionally by how many jets each nation buys, meaning the U.S., with over 50%, essentially decides. Gripen E customers have more influence individually. This is a crucial factor for governments and air forces, but impossible to reflect in a simple comparison.

Another point: all F-35 maintenance must go through the United States, whereas each Gripen operator can be fully independent. As long as the U.S. remains a friendly and cooperative state, this isn’t a problem. But having a foreign country effectively control airworthiness is unsettling for some buyers. I don’t believe for a second that there’s an actual “kill switch” in the F-35, but the ability of the manufacturer to withhold maintenance approval is a real concern. This is normal in civilian aviation though, but the stakes are different when it comes to national defence.

Cost

This is the F-35’s Achilles heel, IMO. Acquisition prices are similar today (some sources still claim the F-35 is more expensive), but the flight-hour cost is the real differentiator: about $40,000 per hour for the F-35 versus about $10,000 for the Gripen E, according to open sources.

Over an expected 8,000-hour lifespan, that’s about $400 million for an F-35 vs. $180 million for a Gripen E. More than twice as expensive. Marketing and “printer ink” pricing models often obscure this because people assume the purchase price is the main cost driver.

One can absolutely argue that security is worth paying for, and I agree. But no one can deny that defence budgets are finite. If you don’t spend the money on a more expensive fighter, you can invest in other systems that are dangerous to the enemy, or even better, deter him from engaging in hostilities in the first place.

Mixed Fleet

Regardless of what you consider most important, we can probably agree both aircraft have advantages. The F-35 excels in deep-strike scenarios, while Gripen E has a more modern software architecture, better decision support, and easier upgrade pathways. Cost clearly favors the Gripen.

Many countries operate mixed fleets. UK, Germany, Poland, France, etc. Sometimes they use different aircraft for different roles; sometimes they mix generations. This adds overhead, but offers real benefits in role optimization. Arguing that a country of 40 million people “can’t” operate two fighter types and must use a single jack-of-all-trades aircraft is not a serious position.

Diversity of suppliers also reduces leverage from any one vendor. A single-supplier fleet makes it harder to set requirements and adapt when reality changes. Whether the ideal split is 16/100 or 32/64 is something to calculate, but pretending there are no advantages to a mixed fleet is unrealistic.

Summary

Debates about fighter procurement tend to resemble soccer fandom. It’s all-or-nothing and the other team is both evil and inferior at everything. And the referee is biased and the beer tastes flat. It’s perfectly reasonable to acknowledge strengths on both sides and avoid picking one “team.” The goal should be a mix that maximizes effect for the available budget and maintains flexibility for the next 30–50 years. That’s responsible risk mitigation.

Mikael Grev