Effective Deterrence through Science & Technology

Maintaining technological superiority has long been key to NATO’s deterrence and defence posture, but that edge is slipping. In this column, John-Mikal Størdal, Director of NATO’s Science and Technology Organization CSO and former Director General of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), outlines how science and technology must once again become a strategic priority. As he argues, it is not just about readiness for today’s threats, but about preparing for the war after tomorrow.

"If you want peace, prepare for war" is a phrase from ancient times that remains relevant today. Looking back, I have observed how technology shapes the character of war. From the Stone Age to the age of cyberwar, there has been a continuous co-evolution of technology and warfare, with disruptive inventions repeatedly rewriting strategic and operational realities.  

In the twenty-first century, I see emerging technologies continuing to push warfare in new and sometimes unexpected directions, while conflict itself stimulates remarkable new technological advances. Over the course of three millennia, the single most consistent factor shaping warfare has been technological change. Conversely, science and technology (S&T) have remained the greatest agent of transformation in war, not only in modern times but throughout human history. Understanding this historical pattern reinforces for me why maintaining technological leadership is so important to secure, and develop our freedom, common values, and way of life. 

From my experience working in the NATO Science & Technology Organization (STO), I have observed firsthand how profoundly technological leadership has shifted over the past two decades. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) recently highlighted this change: between 2003–2007, the United States led in 60 of 64 critical technologies, while China was leading in only 3. Today, in 2019–2023, China has emerged as the global leader in 57 of 64 technologies, many with direct military relevance. 

This situation increasingly seems like a new “Sputnik Moment” to me. When the US realized back in 1957 following the Soviet launch of the Sputnik satellite, that it needed to catch up with the apparent S&T gap, swift action was taken. Following increased investments into education, research and development (R&D), NASA and DARPA were established less than one year later. What is today the NATO Center for Maritime Research and Experimentation (CMRE) was established in Italy in 1959. The OECD followed suit and stimulated S&T R&D civilian investments in their European member nations during the 60’s. Observing the speed and scale of China’s current advancements, I see a similar strategic inflection point today. The need for action is greater now than at any time since the end of the Cold War. 

Some might argue that we took it for granted. That we became too confident in our technological leadership role. That we underplayed, sometimes ignored, the risk that future technological hegemony might be in the hands of our adversaries. 

I am fully aware that S&T is not a goal in itself, but a critical enabler to develop and deliver cutting-edge capabilities to ensure military advantage, provide security and resilience but also prosperity to our societies and to protect the sovereignty of our democracies. 

NATO’s commitment to allocate 5% of GDP to defence and defence-related security by 2035 signals that incrementalism is no longer sufficient. But resources alone are not enough. We need to spend the money wisely and it is essential to avoid the trap of preparing to fight the last war and instead leapfrog ahead in developing the S&T needed to fight, or hopefully deter, the next one. The danger is that old instincts kick in: thinking only in terms of sheer numbers of traditional weapons systems such as tanks and artillery, fighters and warships.  

I would claim that to fully leverage new disruptive technologies the structure of the organization, the people and the concept of operation most likely must change. This is hard and history – not only military history – is full of examples of how the faster adapter has the upper hand. Sentimentality risks the lives of our warfighters - in Warfare receiving the silver medal is not an attractive option. 

In my view, we must fill the holes in the current structure but even more important, we must prepare for the “war after tomorrow.” This requires decisive investment in dual-use development, high-risk/high-reward development programmes, and faster pathways from prototype to deployment. Such breakthroughs, like cruise missiles, GPS, or stealth in earlier eras, can shift deterrence dynamics and secure enduring military advantage.  

These programmes, characterised by ambitious objectives, rapid prototyping, tolerance for failure, and streamlined transition pathways can deliver disproportionate operational advantage and reset the deterrence calculus. Without a portfolio that includes such investments, the Alliance risks falling behind those who are willing to pursue transformational breakthroughs. 

An important part of this approach is to strike a better balance: between traditional platforms and inexpensive scalable systems, between primes and SMEs/start-ups, and between short- and long-term investments. I also firmly believe that we must be better at integrating advances from civilian S&T R&D. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated how low-cost unmanned systems, when adapted rapidly, can neutralize far more expensive legacy assets.  

Military procurement has traditionally followed a top-down model of governments identifying the need for certain capabilities, then commissioning suppliers to develop them. Modern defence demands flexible, iterative procurement driven by frontline feedback, rapid prototyping, and iterative testing that drive capability development. 

Ensuring access to the best weapons and equipment has always been essential to NATO’s ability to deter and defend against adversaries, and to guarantee the freedom and security of its more than 1 billion people. The technological edge NATO countries established over numerically larger Soviet forces helped to end the cold war without ever having to fight it. 

We are in the midst of a global race for technological advantage and we need a higher sense of urgency. Maintaining the technological edge is not easy – it is expensive and it is hard work. We are in a marathon - not a sprint.