– We have seen a very significant Russian risk-taking where the stakes have been raised further during the year. Russia has not achieved any of its strategic goals with the war, but there is no indication that the Russian leadership has abandoned its far-reaching ambitions. There are difficult-to-assess but real risks of further escalation, says Lena Hallin, head of the Military Intelligence and Security Service, Must, in a statement on the Armed Forces' website.
In the same article, the Armed Forces state that the military attack on Ukraine has been met with a strong and joint response in the political, economic, and military fields from Western countries, including Sweden. The endurance of support and unity in the West will continue to be crucial for the outcome of the war.
As a result of the Russian war of aggression, Sweden decided in May 2022, simultaneously with Finland, to apply for NATO membership. Must's assessment is that Sweden is safer after the NATO application was submitted.
– Sweden received bilateral security assurances from several NATO countries in connection with the NATO application, and the assessment is that Russia still wants to avoid an escalation that could lead to an armed conflict with NATO, but at the same time, the Russian leadership's high risk-taking creates uncertainty, continues Lena Hallin.
During the year, the intelligence threat against Sweden has also increased, not least after Sweden's decision to seek NATO membership. Lena Hallin emphasises that it is not only Russia but also, among others, China that conducts security-threatening activities against Sweden.
– Both countries have the capability to carry out complex operations in attempts to influence Swedish political and economic decisions. Public opinion and decision-making processes in Sweden – the core of our democracy – are closely monitored. Awareness of this threat must increase.
Foreign powers are broadly seeking vulnerabilities in our open and digitalised society. No distinction is made between civilian and military, or between private and public. Opportunities to exploit gaps in our organisation, legislation, and cooperation are continuously explored. Various types of intelligence or influence operations against Sweden can be utilised at all levels of conflict. They are ongoing here and now and often cross our agency boundaries and mandates, challenging Sweden's ability to take countermeasures and make decisions.
– Since the threats are directed at all parts of society, it is crucial that Sweden meets them with a comprehensive national approach both within the government administration, the private sector, and society at large. Vigilance, security protection work, and the robustness of our society must be strengthened, says Lena Hallin.
In parallel with a high operational pressure on the intelligence and security service during 2022, Must has continued to develop. Cooperation has been strengthened with the Security Service and the National Defence Radio Establishment – at the core of the intelligence and security community – as well as with several agencies within total defence and international partners. This is necessary to meet the serious and complex threat landscape. Of particular importance are also the steps Must is taking to strengthen future capabilities on a broad scale with the help of digitalisation and AI.
Lena Hallin notes that Must has had a busy year with high demand from both the government and the supreme commander.
– I am proud of the dedicated and competent staff at Must, who have made important and extensive efforts for a safer Sweden in a more uncertain and dangerous world during the year.